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Inverse Condemnation Under the




Eminent domain is the power to condemn. In Pennsylvania a
condemnation is the taking, injury, or destruction of private property
for a public purpose.' The Commonwealth has an inherent power of
eminent domain2 and the constitution authorizes delegation of this
power to municipal3 and private corporations.4 A constitutional
limitation restricts eminent domain powers by establishing Common-
wealth liability for property "taken" and requiring municipal and
other corporations to make just compensation for property "taken,
injured or destroyed." 5  Among the property interests protected by
these provisions are leaseholds, 6 easements,7 life tenancies and re-
maindermen's interests,8 and fees simple.
1. According to the Eminent Domain Code, "'Condemn' means to take, in-
jure or destroy private property by authority of law for a public purpose." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-201(1) (Supp. 1975). As indicated in the official comment to this
section, the quoted provision was drafted in accordance with article X, § 4 of the
Pennsylvania constitution.
2. Lazarus v. Morris, 212 Pa. 128, 130, 61 A. 815, 816 (1905).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 306, 314 (1974).
4. Id. tit. 15, § 1322 (Supp. 1975).
5. Regarding the Commonwealth the constitution provides, "[N]or shall private
property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just
compensation being first made or secured." PA. CONsT. art. I, § 10. Similarly, "[m]u-
nicipal and other corporations invested with the privilege of taking private property
for public use shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed."
Id. art. X, § 4. Note that the Commonwealth is liable only for property "taken,"
but municipal and other corporations must make just compensation for property
"taken, injured or destroyed."
6. Hoffman v. Commonwealth, 422 Pa. 144, 221 A.2d 315 (1966).
7. E.g., Wolf v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 422 Pa. 34, 220 A.2d
868 (1966); Schuster v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 395 Pa. 441, 149 A.2d 447
(1959); Cox's Inc. v. Snodgrass, 372 Pa. 148, 92 A.2d 540 (1952).
8. Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. Getz, 113 Pa. 214, 6 A. 356 (1886); Har-
risburg Borough v. Crangle, 3 W. & S. 460 (Pa. 1842).
9. The Code includes holders of these interests in its definition of condem-
nees, but explicitly excludes mortgagees, judgment creditors, and other lienholders be-
cause their interests are not of the magnitude demanding protection. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 1-201(2), Comment (Supp. 1975).
Procedure in eminent domain cases, as outlined in the Emi-
nent Domain Code of 1964,10 calls for two determinations: (1)
whether a condemnation has occurred; and (2) if there has been a
condemnation, what compensation must be made. Statutory pro-
visions require the condemnor to file a declaration of taking"
with sufficient security.' 2 Notice of the condemnation must be given
to the local recorder of deeds"8 and the condemnee,"4 who can then
file preliminary objections challenging the proceedings" or peti-
tion the court for the appointment of viewers.' 6 When a condemna-
tion is compensable, just compensation must be made to the con-
demnee. 17  Section 602 of the Code'" defines just compensation as
the difference between the fair market value of the property before
and after the condemnation.
Courts also recognize a condemnation when a condemnor takes,
injures, or destroys a property interest without the filing of a declara-
tion of taking. 19 Such a condemnation is said to be inverse or de
facto because the burden is upon the condemnee to initiate the
judicial proceedings. Section 502(e) of the Code20 gives the land-
owner in a de facto condemnation the right to petition for the
appointment of a board of viewers to assess his just compensation.
While the claimant is permitted to assert his right to damages, he
has no right to a determination of the propriety of the condemna-
tion. This is in marked contrast to condemnations in which a formal
declaration of taking has been filed. In those situations the con-
10. Act of June 22, 1964, P.L 84, No. 6 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26
§§ 1-101 to -903 (Supp. 1975)).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1975).
12. Id. § 1-403.
13. Id. § 1-404.
14. Id. § 1-405.
15. Id. § 1-406.
16. Id. § 1-502(a).
17. "The condemnee shall be entitled to just compensation for the taking, in-
jury or destruction of his property." Id. § 1-601. A comprehensive discussion of
the issues involved in this phase of the proceedings is provided by Comment, Eminent
Domain: Just Compensation When the Condemnor Enters Before Instituting Proceed-
ings, 75 DIcK. L. REv. 303 (1970).
18. Just compensation shall consist of the difference between the fair
market value of condemnee's entire property interest immediately before the
condemnation and as unaffected thereby and the fair market value of his
property interest remaining immediately after such condemnation and as
affected thereby, and such other damages as are provided in this code.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-602(a) (Supp. 1975).
19. Hazleton Redev. Auth. v. Hudock, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 670, 281 A.2d
914 (1971).
20. "If there has been a compensable injury suffered and no declaration of tak-
ing therefor has been filed, a condemnee may file a petition for the appointment of
viewers substantially in the form provided for in subsection (a) of this section, set-
ting forth such injury." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-502(e) (Supp. 1975). The com-
ment to this section indicates that it "is . . . to cover the situation where there is




demnee can question the propriety of the condemnation in his pre-
liminary objections.
2 1
Although the Eminent Domain Code has been in effect for over
a decade, courts continue to struggle with its application to inverse
condemnations. This comment will consider two aspects of inverse
condemnation. First, consideration will be given to recent develop-
ments in the substantive law of what constitutes a de facto condemna-
tion. Emphasis will be placed upon the characteristics of a taking
and consequential damages. Second, the remedies provided by the
Code for affected landowners will be analyzed to determine their
extent and sufficiency.
II. The Concept of Taking
A. The Protection of Property Rights
The concept of a taking is central to eminent domain law. A
condemnor must provide compensation if it takes private property
for a public purpose.22 An understanding of the elements of a
taking is necessary, therefore, to recognize when the right to com-
pensation arises and when an inverse condemnation proceeding can
be brought.
In Griggs v. Allegheny County23 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania determined that "a 'taking' occurs when the entity clothed with
the power of eminent domain substantially deprives an owner of the
beneficial use and enjoyment of his property. '24  Courts have loosely
quoted this definition with little or no further analysis or develop-
ment.25 In applying the test, however, courts should recognize that a
landowner may be substantially deprived of the use and enjoyment of
his property by action short of a physical appropriation of the land.
The law has long protected the right of an owner of land to
enjoy it without the physical interference of others.2" Only with
21. See notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra.
22. The Commonwealth is liable for property "taken" for public use and mu-
nicipal and other corporations are liable for property "taken, injured or destroyed for
public use." See notes 48-50 and accompanying text infra.
23. 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 84
(1962).
24. Id. at 414, 168 A.2d at 124 (citations omitted).
25. E.g., Henry v. County of Allegheny, 403 Pa. 272, 277, 169 A.2d 874, 876
(1961); Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. Securda & Co., 16 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 40, 43, 329 A.2d 296, 297 (1974).
26. 11 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW oF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.26, at 329-
30 (rev. 3d ed. F. Ellard 1964).
the benefit of Professor Hohfeld's recognition of the latent ambigui-
ties in the term "property, '2 7 however, have the courts come to deal
with the elusiveness of the concept in eminent domain proceedings.28
The proper method of determining whether a taking exists is not
to consider property in a physical sense only, but rather to assess the
effect of the condemnor's activities on the limited rights of a property
holder.29
On occasion courts have adopted this analysis. Thus, a tak-
ing occurs when the terms of an ordinance effect a condemnation °
or when a zoning ordinance is overly restrictive."' Similarly, in
Sansom Street, Caplan's Appeal 2 the supreme court found that
when thirteen feet of a fifteen-foot-deep lot were condemned
for street expansion, the remaining two feet were taken as well.
This approach recognizes that one may be deprived of his rights to
the use and enjoyment of his land even though there has been no
actual entry by another.
The term "taking" focuses on whether the owner's rights have
been substantially deprived, not on whether the condemnor has taken
property for its own use. The United States Supreme Court in United
States v. General Motors Corp."s recognized this in pointing out that
"the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a
right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. ' 34 It logi-
cally follows that the measure of just compensation is the loss sus-
tained by the condemnee and not the gain of the condemnor 33
The importance of Hohfeldian property concepts in inverse con-
demnation cases is clear: de facto takings can occur even though the
condemnor has never entered upon the land if the owner has suffered
a substantial loss of use and enjoyment of his property. The concept
is especially significant to landowners affected by extensive govern-
ment planning.
27. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 29 (Cook ed. 1923).
28. Full consideration of the development of this concept is contained in Stoe-
buck, Condemnation by Nuisance, The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect, 71
DICK. L. REV. 207 (1966).
29. Property may be defined as certain rights in things which pertain to
persons and which are created and sanctioned by law. These rights are the
right of user, the right of exclusion and the right of disposition. These
rights are not possessed in an absolute degree, but are limited.
1 J. LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 63 (3d ed. 1909).
30. Philadelphia Appeal, 364 Pa. 71, 70 A.2d 847 (1950).
31. E.g., Valley Hills Civic Ass'n v. Board of Adj., 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408
(1964); Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957); Medinger
Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954).
32. 293 Pa. 483, 143 A. 134 (1928).
33. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
34. Id. at 378.
35. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946); Garella v. Redevelop-
ment Auth., 413 Pa. 181, 189 n.4, 196 A.2d 344, 348 n.4 (1964).
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B. Planning, Preparation, and Negotiation Without a Taking
In recent years a line of cases has developed that considers
whether urban redevelopment planning can effect a taking of the
property to be condemned under the plan before a declaration of
taking is filed. To the extent that courts have found that a de
facto taking has occurred, they are in conformity with the expanding
concept of property. Section 604' 6 of the Code provides that
when a change in market value of the property is caused by the
imminence of condemnation, the change should be disregarded in the
award of compensation. In some cases this provision is not adequate.
If the planning activities of a condemnor substantially deprive an
owner of the use of his land, a de facto taking occurs.
Historically, the mere plotting of a street on a city map did not
give an affected landowner an immediate claim for damages3 7 The
underlying policy is sound. If a de facto taking occurred every time a
landowner's use of his land was inconvenienced by government plan-
ning, public bodies would be hesitant to engage in planning. 8  For
this reason, the traditional rule has retained considerable vitality. In
Department of Transportation v. Securda & Co.39 the commonwealth
court found that there had not been a taking although part
of Securda's land lay within a right of way on a published plan and all
properties totally within the right of way had already been purchased.
The rule, however, must be kept in its proper perspective. As
originally formulated, it applied only to streets plotted in areas of
relatively sparse population, where injury to the landowner's interests
would be less than in more developed areas.40 In Miller v. Beaver
Falls4 the supreme court refused to extend the rule to a city's plot-
ting of a park and playground on the city map. When a case does
36. "Any change in the fair market value prior to the date of condemnation
which the condemnor or condemnee establishes was substantially due to the general
knowledge of the imminence of condemnation . . . shall be disregarded in determin-
ing fair market value." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-604 (Supp. 1975).
37. Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 261, 95 A. 429, 430 (1915). See
Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 127 (1971).
38. Allegheny County v. Church of Jesus Christ, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
510, 515, 322 A.2d 803, 805 (1974).
39. 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 40, 329 A.2d 296 (1974); accord, Allegheny
County v. Church of Jesus Christ, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 510, 322 A.2d 803
(1974); Commonwealth Appeal, 422 Pa. 72, 221 A.2d 289 (1966).
40. Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 261, 95 A. 429, 430 (1915).
41. 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951). In reaching its decision, the court char-
acterized the rule as "[a] principle of questionable constitutionality." Id. at 196, 82
A.2d at 37.
not involve the plotting of streets in a sparsely populated area, a dif-
ferent rule should apply.
Some authority that urban planning can effect a taking is found
in the "exceptional circumstances"42 test applied by the courts. The
cases using this test deal with factual situations different from those
that gave rise to the original rule that planning cannot effect a taking.
Two recent cases are illustrative of this point. In Commonwealth's
Crosstown Expressway Appea 4 3 the commonwealth court held that
publicity of a proposed condemnation, discouragement of private
development, and notice of the condemnation to petitioner's ten-
ants who then refused to renew their leases were tantamount to a
taking of petitioner's property because of "exceptional circum-
stances. 44  A strikingly similar factual situation faced the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Common-
wealth.45  The condemnor over a twelve-year period had publi-
cized its plans to extend a boulevard that would necessarily involve
a taking of petitioner's land. As a result of the publicity the glass
company lost a number of its lessees, causing such a decrease
in income that it was unable to pay its property taxes and risked loss
of the premises at tax sale.46 The court found it to be a de facto
taking.
The full impact of these cases is uncertain. It is conceivable
that the striking similarity of their facts will cause practitioners
and courts to limit their application to losses of rental income.
A broader reading of the cases recognizes that de facto tak-
ings occur when planning results in a substantial loss of reve-
nue from commercial realty.47 This reading is justified by both
modem property concepts and recognition that urban planning has
a greater effect on property interests than does planning in sparsely
populated areas.
42. The phrase "exceptional circumstances" was originally used to describe a
situation in which an owner has been deprived of the use and enjoyment of his land
without a physical entry. Sansom Street, Caplan's Appeal, 293 Pa. 483, 489, 143
A. 134, 135 (1928). See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
43. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1, 281 A.2d 909 (1971), noted in 46 TEMP. L.Q.
139 (1972).
44. Commonwealth's Crosstown Expwy. Appeal, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1,
5, 281 A.2d 909, 912 (1971).
45. 456 Pa. 384, 321 A.2d 598 (1974), rev'g 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 66, 298
A.2d 672 (1972).
46. Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Commonwealth, 456 Pa. 384, 393 n.2, 321
A.2d 598, 602 n.2 (1974).
47. It was suggested in Conroy-Prugh that the distinguishing common fact
in both Crosstown and Conroy-Prugh was "that the publicity about the inevitable
condemnation caused a loss of tenants, making the property useless for its highest
and best use-commercial property." Id. at 389, 321 A.2d at 600 (emphasis added);
accord, Allegheny County v. Church of Jesus Christ, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 510,





Under article I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania constitution, the
Commonwealth is liable for the taking of private property.48  Munic-
ipal and other corporations vested with the power of eminent domain
are liable for property "taken, injured or destroyed."4 9  The consti-
tutional distinction is important: while the Commonwealth is only
liable for a taking of property, municipal and other corporations with
eminent domain powers are liable for a taking and any injury or de-
struction of a landowner's property. The term "consequential dam-
ages" has been adopted by the courts to refer to those condemna-
tions that do not result from a taking but from the injury or destruc-
tion of property. The Commonwealth is liable for consequential
damages only to the extent specified by statute. 50 Sections 612"'
and 61352 of the Code establish Commonwealth liability for injury
to abutting property caused by a change of grade, permanent inter-
ference with access, or injury to surface support.53
Procedurally, consequential damages are a form of inverse con-
demnation. Although section 40211 requires a condemnor to file a
declaration of taking if its activities will result in either a taking or
consequential damages, if no declaration is filed an affected land-
owner can petition for the appointment of viewers under section
502(e).55 The condemnee, however, cannot challenge the pro-
priety of the condemnation.
48. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
49. Id. art. X, § 4.
50. E.g., Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 182 A.2d 514 (1962); Brewer v. Com-
monwealth, 345 Pa. 144, 27 A.2d 53 (1942); Heil v. Allegheny County, 330 Pa. 449,
199 A. 341 (1938).
51. All condemnors, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, shall
be liable for damages to property abutting the area of an improvement re-
sulting from a change of grade of a road or highway, permanent interference
with access thereto, or injury to surface support, whether or not any property
is taken.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-612 (Supp. 1975).
52. "Whenever a public road, street or highway is vacated, the affected owners
may recover damage for any injuries sustained thereby, even though no land is actu-
ally taken." Id. § 1-613.
53. Relatively few cases have been brought under § 613 alone; most cases
dealing with loss of access due to vacation of a street have alleged as a basis of recov-
ery § 612 and § 613. The result has been that in this class of cases the restriction
of recovery to "abutting" landowners in § 612 has been liberalized because the own-
er's rights are "subsumed under the more general language of section 613." Hession
Condemn. Case, 430 Pa. 273, 277, 242 A.2d 432, 434 (1968).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402, Comment (Supp. 1975).
55. Id. § 1-502, Comment.
Substantively, the constitutional distinction between a taking
and consequential damages for injury and destruction of property has
resulted in a number of artificial and unworkable tests intended to
define consequential damages. The definition has two branches.
First, a distinction is made between a taking and "[c]onsequential
damages [that] arise when property is not actually taken or entered
but an injury to it occurs as the natural result of an act lawfully done
by another."56  Implicit in this distinction is the assumption that a
taking involves an actual taking or entry. Because the concept of a
taking has assumed a broader meaning in recent years, this is a
weakness in the definition of consequential damages. Second, the
courts have recognized that the "injured or destroyed" language in the
constitution does not abrogate the common-law concept of damnum
absque injuria.57  Thus, consequential damages necessitate not only
a "proximate, immediate, and substantial" ' s injury caused by the
otherwise lawful exercise of the condemnor's power of eminent do-
main,59 but also an injury different in degree and kind from that
suffered by all other landowners in the vicinity.60
Undue reliance upon these principles has resulted in decisions
lacking in conceptual clarity. In Hession Condemnation Case,6' for
instance, the supreme court found that although the vacation and
relocation of a street originally passing in front of petitioner's restau-
rant caused a diversion of traffic and concomitant loss of patronage,
the injury was not compensable because it did not differ in kind from
that suffered by other landowners in the vicinity. 2 The distinction
56. This definition was first formulated in Soldiers' & Sailors' Mem. Bridge,
308 Pa. 487, 490, 162 A. 309, 310 (1932), although it has been relied upon verbatim
in more recent decisions as well. E.g., Ewalt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 382
Pa. 529, 533, 115 A.2d 729, 731 (1955); Puloka v. Commonwealth, 323 Pa. 36, 41,
185 A. 801, 803 (1936).
57. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 559, 13 A. 690, 697 (1888).
Public policy justifies this conclusion. If the constitutional language were inter-
preted broadly to cover all injuries or destructions, this would result in an undue bur-
den on public improvement planning. 2A NICHOLS' EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441[1]
(rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman 1975).
58. Ogontz Ave., 225 Pa. 126, 129, 73 A. 1096 (1902); accord, Mitchell Con-
demn. Case, 209 Pa. Super. 288, 294, 228 A.2d 53, 56 (1967).
59. To be compensable in an eminent domain proceeding, the consequential
damages must result from the exercise of the power of eminent domain and not from
the exercise of the police power, McGrady Case, 399 Pa. 586, 160 A.2d 715 (1960),
or a trespass by, or the negligence of, the condemnor. See notes 87-88 and accom-
panying text infra.
60. E.g., Spang & Co. v. Commonwealth, 281 Pa. 414, 418, 126 A. 781, 782-
83 (1924); Mitchell Condemn. Case, 209 Pa. Super. 288, 294, 228 A.2d 53, 56-57
(1967); Hindes v. Allegheny County, 123 Pa. Super. 469, 475, 187 A. 219, 222
(1936).
61. 430 Pa. 273, 242 A.2d 432 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969).
62. Id. at 281, 242 A.2d at 435; accord, e.g., Wolf v. Commonwealth, Dep't
of Highways, 422 Pa. 34, 220 A.2d 868 (1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp.
v. Nod's Inc., 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 192, 321 A.2d 373 (1974); Commonwealth,
Dep't of Transp. v. Kastner, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 525, 320 A.2d 146 (1974).
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fails to recognize the possibility that a taking has occurred even
though the disruption of traffic patterns is the same interference
suffered by other affected landowners.6" Although this proposition
was rejected by the Hession court,64 it should be noted that the case
was decided six years before Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Common-
wealth.65 The courts have recognized that when a landowner is faced
with exceptional circumstances that deprive him of the use and en-
joyment of his land, his property has been taken.66 If the owner
of commercial realty suffers a substantial loss of revenue because of
the activities of a condemnor, his land is taken and the technical
distinctions defining consequential damages are irrelevant.
To eliminate Commonwealth immunity from consequential
damages entirely would probably require a constitutional amendment
because the immunity is latent in the phraseology of the constitu-
tion.67  With the recent expansion of the definition of taking to in-
clude more than actual physical takings, however, it is likely that the
Commonwealth's liability will expand. Claims against the Common-
wealth previously dismissed because they involved injury and de-
struction of property will now be subsumed within the definition of
taking.
IV. Alternative Remedies in Inverse Condemnation
A. Preliminary Objections to a Formal Declaration of Taking
Once notice of the filing of a declaration of taking has been
served,68 substantive and procedural challenges to a condemnation
can be made only by means of preliminary objections.69 The ex-
63. A thorough treatment and criticism of the failure of the courts to adopt
this approach is provided by Comment, Traffic Oriented Business and Highway Vaca-
tions, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 671 (1969).
64. Hession Condemn. Case, 430 Pa. 273, 281-82, 242 A.2d 432, 436 (1968).
65. 456 Pa. 384, 321 A.2d 598 (1974). It may be further noted that all au-
thorities cited in note 62 supra were decided prior to the significant expansion of the
concept of a de facto taking recognized by the supreme court in Conroy-Prugh.
66. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
67. See O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187, 190 (1851). When a constitution
uses two distinct descriptions of condemnation, the distinction must be given effect
to render the language meaningful. 2 NICHOLS' EMINENT DoMAIN § 6.38[1] (rev.
3d ed. J. Sackman 1975).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-405 (Supp. 1975).
69. Preliminary objections shall be limited to and shall be the exclusive
method of challenging (1) the power or right of the condemnor to appro-
priate the condemned property unless the same has been previously adjudi-
cated; (2) the sufficiency of the security; (3) any other procedure followed
by the condemnor; or (4) the declaration of taking.
Id. § 1-406.
press legislative intent in allowing preliminary objections is to consoli-
date all challenges to a condemnation into one proceeding and to
provide efficient disposition of claims.70 The proceeding is separate
and distinct from any determination of damages and the common
pleas order passing upon the validity of the condemnation is final and
appealable. 7
The scope of a challenge to the right or power of the condemn-
ing authority is limited. Courts will not substitute their discretion
for that of the condemnor absent clear proof of an abuse of discre-
tion.72  In Redevelopment Authority v. Owners73 preliminary objec-
tions were sustained, however, upon proof that the condemnation was
purely for the benefit of a private individual.
When a condemnee believes that his property has been de facto
condemned, a subsequent filing of a declaration of taking by the
condemnor will preclude the condemnee from petitioning for a board
of viewers under section 502(e).74  A remedy under section 502(e)
is available only if "no declaration of taking . . . has been filed.
'75
This preclusion poses a serious threat to condemnees. Section 402
(a) provides that "[c]ondemnation . . . shall be effected only by
the filing in court of a declaration of taking. ' 76 Because compensa-
tion under section 60277 is fixed by the value of the condemned
property at the time of condemnation, this results in an assessment
of damages based upon the value of the property on the date of the
declaration of taking. Owners whose property depreciates between
the date of the de facto condemnation and the declaration of taking
receive inadequate compensation for their losses.
The commonwealth court has recognized this dilemma and as-
sured the condemnee a remedy under the Code. In the case of Nelis
v. Redevelopment Authority78 the condemnee owned commercial
properties in Pittsburgh that had been included in an extensive urban
renewal plan as early as 1951, although there were no formal con-
70. Id. § 1:406, Comment.
71. Valley Forge Golf Club v. Upper Merion Tp., 422 Pa. 227, 221 A.2d 292
(1966); accord, e.g., Hanni Appeal, 420 Pa. 289, 216 A.2d 774 (1966); Faranda Ap-
peal, 420 Pa. 295, 216 A.2d 769 (1966).
72. E.g., Washington Park, Inc. Appeal, 425 Pa. 349, 229 A.2d 1 (1967); Pe-
ters v. Department of Forests & Waters, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 330, 314 A.2d
584 (1974); Simco Stores v. Philadelphia Redev. Auth., 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
374, 302 A.2d 907 (1973).
73. 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 378, 274 A.2d 244 (1971); accord, Golden Dawn
Shops, Inc. v. Philadelphia Redev. Auth., 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 314, 320, 282
A.2d 395, 398 (1971).
74. Nelis v. Redevelopment Auth., 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 338, 341, 315
A.2d 893, 894-95 (1974).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-502(e) (Supp. 1975).
76. Id. § 1-402(a).
77. For the text of this provision see note 18 supra.
78. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 533, 287 A.2d 880 (1972).
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demnations in the area until 1966. Before a declaration of
taking was filed on the Nelis land, a building on it was destroyed by
fire. After the condemnor filed a declaration, the viewers made an
award excluding compensation for the building. Nelis appealed, al-
leging a de facto taking prior to the fire. The court held that a
condemnee can raise the issue of a prior de facto taking by prelimi-
nary objections and that failure to do so at that time constitutes a
waiver of the right.79 The court reasoned,
If upon the date of the filing of a declaration of taking the prop-
erty owner is of the opinion that prior activities and actions of
the condemnor constitute a de facto taking, a condemnation as
a matter of law has already occurred. In such an event, the
condemnor's attempted exercise of that power by the filing of a
declaration of taking is in issue, an issue which in our opinion
goes to the very heart of its power or right to condemn by for-
mal condemnation proceedings.8 0
A later commonwealth court decision supplemented the Nelis
holding and fully defined the scope of preliminary objections. In
Ramad Realty Corp. v. Springettsbury Township Sewer Authority8
the court held that after a declaration of taking is filed, preliminary
objections are the proper method to challenge the validity of a com-
pleted de facto condemnation.
The practical effect of these two decisions is to leave an owner of
property that has been de facto condemned with two mutually exclu-
sive remedies. Prior to the filing of a declaration of taking, he
can petition for an award of compensation. After a declaration
of taking has been filed, he can assert both the fact of a prior de
facto taking and the impropriety of it. The lack of statutory
means to challenge the validity of a de facto condemnation prior to
the filing of a declaration of taking results in reliance upon common-
law remedies outside the Code.
B. Remedies Not Excluded by the Eminent Domain Code
Section 30382 states that the Code's purpose is "to pro-
vide a complete and exclusive procedure and law to govern all
79. Section 406 provides, "Within thirty days after being served with notice of
condemnation, the condemnee may file preliminary objections to the declaration of
taking. . . . Failure to raise these matters by preliminary objections shall constitute
a waiver thereof." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406(a) (Supp. 1975).
80. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 537-38, 287 A.2d at 883.
81. 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1, 5-6, 309 A.2d 80, 82-83 (1973).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-303 (Supp. 1975).
condemnations of property for public purposes." The statute fails to
achieve this purpose when there has been a de facto condemnation. A
de facto condemnee can petition for the appointment of viewers to
award compensation, but he is left without a statutory remedy to
challenge the validity of the condemnation. Because of the failure of
the Code to provide an adequate remedy, certain common-law actions
can still be pursued by a condemnee.
1. Trespass and Ejectment.-If a condemnor takes, injures, or
destroys private property for a public purpose, even without the filing
of a declaration of taking, it is a lawful condemnation and is com-
pensable under section 502(e). A taking, injury, or destruction of
private property is unlawful, however, if the condemnor cannot prove
that the action was taken for a public purpose.88 Both trespass and
ejectment are available to a landowner whose property rights have
been unlawfully abridged by a condemnor.
Prior to the enactment of the Eminent Domain Code, the failure
of a condemnor to make or secure compensation prior to its entry
gave rise to an action in trespass. 84 When the only issue is the failure
to make compensation through condemnation proceedings, however,
the Code now provides the landowner an adequate remedy before a
board of viewers.85 On the other hand, an action in trespass can
still be brought against a condemnor in two situations. First, trespass
is a proper remedy in a situation that technically is not an inverse
condemnation-when the injury is not a result of the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. If a lawful condemnation results in injury
to property, the injury is compensable as consequential damages.8 "
When a condemnor causes damage to property not as a result of
its exercise of the power of eminent domain, but as a result of its
negligence" or tortious entry, 8 however, any recovery must be in
trespass. Recently, the commonwealth court in Commonwealth, De-
partment of Transportation v. Castillo8" found that when a landown-
er's well was polluted by the negligent storage of calcium cloride on
adjoining lands, recovery had to be in trespass.
83. The meaning and constitutional significance of the public use limitation is
discussed in 2A NICHOLS' EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 7.2, 7.31 (rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman
1975); Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U.L. REV. 615 (1940); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Do-
main: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
84. Cochran Coal Co. v. Management Mun. Auth., 380 Pa. 397, 110 A.2d 345
(1955).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-502(e) (Supp. 1975).
86. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
87. Lizza v. Uniontown City, 345 Pa. 363, 28 A.2d 916 (1942).
88. Koontz v. Commonwealth, 364 Pa. 145, 70 A.2d 308 (1950); Burkholder
v. Commonwealth, 347 Pa. 478, 32 A.2d 745 (1943); Culver v. Commonwealth, 346
Pa. 262, 29 A.2d 531 (1943).
89. 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 22, 321 A.2d 394 (1974).
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The second situation in which a trespass action should be per-
mitted is when the condemnation is invalid. Although the Code com-
pensates a condemnee whose property has not been formally con-
demned, there is no reason to believe that this precludes an action
at common law that challenges the validity of the condemnation."
If he institutes such an action, -proof of his possession of the
premises and the entry of the defendant thereon would make
out a prima facie case, and as the defendant ... would be un-
able to justify its entry under the statute . . . in accordance
with which it purported to act, the plaintiff would necessarily
prevail. 91
Although there are no Pennsylvania cases on point, it is certainly
logical that if an entry is not justifiable as an exercise of the power of
eminent domain, then it is unlawful. 92 As indicated in Gardner v.
County of Allegheny,9" equity courts traditionally have enjoined as
continuing trespasses activities of condemnors that cannot be justified
as an exercise of the power of eminent domain. Furthermore, tres-
pass has been recognized in other jurisdictions, notably the New
England states, as a proper means to challenge the validity of a
condemnation.
94
Prior to the adoption of the Code in 1964, ejectment was also a
proper remedy for one whose land had been entered under an invalid
claim of eminent domain." As a practical matter, however, a con-
demnor is likely to file a declaration of taking when either a trespass
or an ejectment action has been initiated against it.96 Determina-
tion of the validity of the condemnation will be relegated to the
eminent domain proceeding. 97  Because of -the equitable nature of an
ejectment action, the courts generally will stay the execution of the
order in ejectment to allow the condemnor to file formal condemna-
90. 6A NICHOLS' EMINENT DOMAIN § 28.3[1] (rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman 1975).
91. Id.
92. Cf. Commonwealth Appeal, 429 Pa. 254, 259 n.3, 239 A.2d 343, 346 n.3
(1968); Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Equitable Gas Co., 421 Pa. 468, 470, 220 A.2d 12,
14 (1966); Scafetta v. City of Chester, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 339 (C.P. Del. 1970).
93. 393 Pa. 120, 142 A.2d 187 (1958); accord, e.g., A.H. Reid Creamery &
Dairy Supp. Co. v. Philadelphia, 274 Pa. 251, 118 A. 11 (1922); Davis v. Southwest
Pa. Pipe Lines, 223 Pa. 56, 72 A. 281 (1909).
94. A discussion of this rule as it developed in Maine, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire is contained in 6 NICHOLS' EMINENT DoMAIN § 25.3[2] (rev. 3d ed.
J. Sackman 1975).
95. Titus v. Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa. 431, 119 A. 540 (1923).
96. 11 E. McQUILLiN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORAT.ONS § 32.129, at 608
(rev. 3d ed. F. Ellard 1964).
97. Ramad Realty Corp. v. Springettsbury Tp. Sewer Auth., 10 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 1, 5-6, 309 A.2d 80, 82 (1973).
tion proceedings. 9s The failure of the legislature to provide a means
to challenge the propriety of a de facto condemnation leaves the
condemnee with the alternative of an action for conditional eject-
ment.99
The practical limitations of these actions, however, demand a
more workable remedy. First, since both trespass and ejectment are
based upon physical interference with property rights, they are not
adaptable to the recent trend toward finding takings in planning,
negotiations, and acquisition of neighboring lands. 0 Second, since a
condemnor can file a declaration of taking after an action in trespass
or ejectment has been commenced, it is likely that two proceedings
will result. This is particularly important in a trespass action because
a later filing of condemnation proceedings will not divest the owner
of his cause of action for damages incurred prior to the declaration
of taking. 01 Duplication of effort by the courts should be avoided.
Furthermore, even if a plaintiff prevails in his action in trespass and
proves a permanent injury, his recovery is limited to the decrease
in market value caused by the entry.'0 2 This recovery is less than
the amount recoverable in a condemnation proceeding. 0 3 The land-
owner in a common-law proceeding cannot recover losses recover-
able under the Code, such as removal expenses, business dislocation
expenses, moving expenses,' 04 and allowances for replacement hous-
ing.
1 0 5
Thus, serious limitations on both trespass and ejectment actions
exist. All challenges to inverse condemnations should be raised in
eminent domain proceedings.' 06 Preliminary objections to a decla-
ration of taking are the most efficient method to dispose of these
issues. Until the Code is amended to provide the condemnee with
a means to challenge the validity of a condemnation that occurs with-
out a declaration of taking, however, he must pursue his common-
law remedies.
2. The Persistence of Equity Jurisdiction.-Trespass and
ejectment are not the only alternatives open to the condemnee.
Equity is available to question the validity of a de facto condemna-
tion because the Code fails to provide any method to adjudicate the
98. Rosenblatt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 398 Pa. 111, 157 A.2d 182
(1959); Oliver v. Pittsburgh V. & C. Ry., 131 Pa. 408, 19 A. 47 (1890).
99. Commonwealth Appeal, 429 Pa. 254, 259, 239 A.2d 343, 346 (1968).
100. See notes 36-47 and accompanying text supra.
101. Keil v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 466, 19 A. 78 (1890); Shevalier
v. Postal Tel. Co., 22 Pa. Super. 506 (1903).
102. Sebree v. Huntingdon Water Supp. Co., 267 Pa. 420, 110 A. 142 (1920).
103. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-601A (Supp. 1975).
105. Id. §§ 1-602A, 1-603A.
106. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
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issue. Moreover, the shortcomings of trespass and ejectment make
equity the most practical remedy available to a landowner who
wishes to stop the condemnation.
In Ramad Realty Corp. v. Springettsbury Township Sewer
Authority'1 7 the commonwealth court analyzed this matter more
thoroughly than any court since the adoption of the Code. Plain-
tiff had filed an action in equity to have a sewer line, which
defendant had installed without formal condemnation, removed and
to receive an award of damages for the unlawful entry. The sewer
authority filed both an answer and a declaration of taking. The
court held that since eminent domain proceedings were underway,
albeit in response to plaintiff's action, the landowner's sole remedy
was preliminary objections. 10 8 The court in dicta, however, ad-
dressed the case of the uncompensated condemnee who wishes to
challenge a condemnation:
There is . . . the possibility that the landowner does not want
damages in a completed de facto taking situation but wants to
challenge the initial validity of -the taking. . . .He does not
wish to proceed under § 502(e) and there is no declaration of
taking to challenge under § 406 whereby his rights may be
protected. In that situation, equity may be invoked in order to
force the authority to proceed with proper condemnation pro-
ceedings.' o9
In addition to the power to order the institution of formal
proceedings, equity also has the power to enjoin an invalid de facto
condemnation. Prior to the Code equity was a valid forum in which
to raise the issue of whether the condemnor had exceeded its power"10
or had exercised bad faith or was unreasonable in its decision" to
condemn. The absence of any statutory remedy suggests that equity
jurisdiction is still available to challenge the validity of an inverse
condemnation.
Since shortly before the adoption of the Code, a line of cases has
developed that superficially seems to remove eminent domain from
equity jurisdiction. Overly conclusive statements, such as those made
in Faranda Appeal" 2 that "the legislature has mandated that prelim-
107. 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1, 309 A.2d 80 (1973).
108. Id. at 5-6, 309 A.2d at 82.
109. Id. at 6, 309 A.2d at 83 (citations omitted).
110. Colove v. Robesonia Borough, 364 Pa. 626,73 A.2d 679 (1950).
111. Spann v. Joint Bds. of School Dirs., 381 Pa. 338, 113 A.2d 281 (1955);
Winger v. Aires, 371 Pa. 242, 89 A.2d 521 (1952); Cheltenham Tp. v. Tookany
Creek Land Dev. Co., 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 662 (C.P. Montg. 1964).
112. 420 Pa. 295, 216 A.2d 769 (1966).
inary objections constitute the exclusive method of challenging the
power of the condemnor to take private property," 118 have given rise
to this impression.'1 4  None of the cases, however, dealt with the
problems involved in a de facto condemnation. In G.C. Murphy Co.
v. Redevelopment Authority,"5 for instance, plaintiff sought to
enjoin the institution of condemnation proceedings. This case is of
no authority when a de facto condemnation is at issue. The major
problem faced by a landowner in a de facto condemnation is that
there is no declaration of taking to which he can file preliminary
objections. Schwab v. Pottstown Borough,'" which held that equity
cannot be invoked to assess damages for a condemnation, is likewise
inapposite. A condemnee who seeks only an award of damages has a
full remedy before a board of viewers. 117  There is no authority
denying equity jurisdiction to consider the validity of a condemnation
when the condemnee has no remedy under the Code.
A situation similar to a de facto condemnation exists when rights
of way are condemned by gas and electric companies. Prior to the
enactment of the Code, such rights of way were condemned under
utility legislation" l8 and challenges to the validity of the taking were
brought in equity. Section 901" 9 of the Eminent Domain Code
excludes condemnations of rights of way by these utilities companies
from the provisions of the Code. The supreme court in Redding
v. Atlantic City Electric Co."20 held that since the Code did
not provide a means to question the validity of condemnations of
rights of way, equity was still a proper forum in which to do so. The
similar lack of a statutory remedy for the landowner in a de facto
113. Id. at 302, 216 A.2d at 772.
114. Justice Roberts in his concurring opinions has repeatedly warned against
the conclusive language that the majority has tended to use in holding that
equity does not have jurisdiction in certain eminent domain matters. Valley Forge
Golf Club v. Upper Merion Tp., 422 Pa. 227, 230-31, 221 A.2d 292, 294 (1966)
(concurring opinion); Cunfer v. Carbon Airport Auth., 414 Pa. 408, 411, 200 A.2d
768, 770 (1964) (concurring opinion). Justice Musmanno similarly stated, "To
shear equity of its long recognized jurisdiction would require more explicit language
than the mere statement that statutory procedures shall be exclusive in the governing
of condemnation proceedings .... ." Mahan v. Lower Merion Tp., 418 Pa. 558,
566, 212 A.2d 217, 221 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
115. 458 Pa. 219, 326 A.2d 358 (1974); accord, e.g., Valley Forge Golf Club
v. Upper Merion Tp., 422 Pa. 227, 221 A.2d 292 (1966); Mahan v. Lower Merion
Tp., 418 Pa. 558, 212 A.2d 217 (1965); Pittsburgh Rys. v. Port of Allegheny County
Auth., 415 Pa. 177, 202 A.2d 816 (1964); Creasy v. Lawler, 389 Pa. 635, 133 A.2d
178 (1957).
116. 407 Pa. 531, 180 A.2d 921 (1962).
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-502(e) (Supp. 1975).
118. Natural Gas Companies Act, id. tit. 15, § 3549 (1967); Electric Light,
Heat & Power Companies Act, id. § 3272.
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-901 (Supp. 1975).
120. 440 Pa. 533, 269 A.2d 680 (1970); accord, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Carr,
4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 571, 287 A.2d 917 (1972). Contra, McConnell Appeal,
428 Pa. 270, 236 A.2d 796 (1968).
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condemnation should form a basis for bringing an action in equity for
an injunction.
Whether an action is brought to compel the filing of a declara-
tion of taking or to attack the validity of a de facto condemnation
directly and request injunctive relief, equity has jurisdiction. It may
be more appropriate to seek to compel the filing of a declaration of
taking and, thus, bring all condemnation issues within an emi-
nent domain proceeding. If this alternative is followed, however,
the condemnee is still involved in two actions, one in equity and one
in eminent domain. Whatever alternative is selected, equity juris-
diction can be invoked by a landowner to challenge the validity of
a condemnation prior to a declaration of taking.
V. A Suggestion for Legislative Reform
The complexity and overlap of remedies available to a con-
demnee whose property has been condemned without the filing of
a declaration of taking is evidence in itself of the need for legislative
action. The Eminent Domain Code fails its express legislative pur-
pose "to provide a complete and exclusive procedure and law to gov-
ern all condemnations of property."12'
Adequate protection of the right to just compensation is pro-
vided by section 502(e) if the condemnee is willing to admit the
legality of the condemnor's activities. A need exists, however, to
provide a complementary procedure in which the condemnee can lit-
igate the condemnation's legality. This would not only be logically
sound and within the purpose of the Code, but would also avoid the
unnecessary and costly multiple litigation likely to result under exist-
ing law.
122
The purpose of such an amendment should be to provide an
efficient means to bring a condemnee's challenge before the court in
an eminent domain proceeding. This would be a full statutory
recognition of the inverse condemnation procedure. Just as the
condemnee's right to petition for the appointment of viewers is estab-
lished in section 502(e) of the Code, the condemnee who wishes to
challenge the validity of a condemnation should be empowered to
effect the institution of formal condemnation proceedings. Such a
provision logically would be inserted in section 402, which deals with
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-303 (Supp. 1975).
122. See notes 96-97, 101 and accompanying text supra.
the procedures for filing a declaration of taking. 12 8 Section 502(e)
need not be eliminated since it would remain available as a remedy
for the condemnee who merely seeks compensation. The following is
suggested as a model for an amendment of section 402:
(e) IN ALL CASES IN WHICH A CONDEMNOR TAKES, INJURES
OR DESTROYS PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT THE INSTITUTION
OF PROCEEDINGS REQUIRED BY THIS SECTION, THE CON-
DEMNEE MAY APPLY TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE PROPERTY IS SITUATE FOR THE
INSTITUTION OF CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THIS SECTION.
The wording of this proposal has several distinct advantages.
First, by adopting the phraseology used in the section 201124 defini-
tion of condemn, "to take, injure, or destroy private property,"
the amendment would be continually adaptable to the evolving con-
cept of a de facto condemnation. Second, the condemnee would
be provided with an opportunity to raise all issues regarding the
condemnation in his preliminary objections without resort to ad-
mittedly tenuous common-law remedies. Third, the condemnee
would enjoy the protection of section 40712" of the Code, which
provides that a writ of possession will not issue until the preliminary
objections are disposed of and then only if they are dismissed. Last,
the condemnee, if his preliminary objections are sustained, would be
entitled to an award under section 406(e)126 for any damages result-
ing from the void condemnation. This would eliminate the need for
an action in trespass to recover for damages to the land.
VI. Conclusion
The law of inverse condemnation in Pennsylvania has undergone
a period of dynamic growth commencing with the adoption of the
Eminent Domain Code in 1964. As the courts have dealt with this
area of the law, new lines of liability and marks of deficient statutory
provisions have become discernible.
The substantive law of de facto condemnations has experienced
marked developments in the past decade. The concept of a taking
has assumed an expansive meaning commensurate with modem
understanding of property. Similarly, by virtue of the more liberal
provisions of the Code, the law of consequential damages has expand-
ed and created new Commonwealth liability.
The procedural law of inverse condemnation, however, is lack-
ing a crucial element. While ample provision is made for the holder
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1975).
124. Id. § 1-201(a).
125. Id. § 1-407(a).
126. Id. § 1-406(e).
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of a property interest that has been condemned without formal pro-
ceedings to seek compensation, he is without statutory means to chal-
lenge the validity of the condemnation. Pre-Code remedies are not
adequate. An amendment to the Eminent Domain Code is needed to
provide a procedure by which a landowner can halt an invalid, de
facto condemnation.
JOHN A. RODGERS
